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Saudis in Iraq: Patterns of
Radicalization and Recruitment
Combattants saoudiens en Irak : modes de radicalisation et de recrutement
Thomas Hegghammer
1 In  the  last  issue  of  Cultures  et  Conflits  (http://www.conflits.org/index2085.html The
voluntary  death  of  the  combatant:  sacrifices  and  strategies,  n°63),  eight  eminent  thinkers
explored  the  complex  phenomenon of  voluntary  death  from a  variety  of  angles,  all
stressing the need to demystify and “de-islamize” the notion of suicide operations and to
recognise the multiplicity of processes leading to self-sacrifice in the modern age. One of
the few specific cases left unexplored in the debate is that of Iraq, which is the main arena
- at least in quantitative terms - for voluntary death and self sacrifice today. This article
shall analyse the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Iraq, who may be distinguished from
other suicide attackers by the fact that the country they are offering to die for is not their
own. 
2 In order to grasp the immensely complex and evolving picture of insurgency in Iraq most
commentators tend to draw a sharp distinction between the foreign fighters on the one
hand, and Iraqi nationalists on the other. The foreigners are widely perceived as the least
legitimate and the most extreme element of the insurgency. As a result, much has been
written about their actions in Iraq, while we know very little about their backgrounds and
motivations1.  It  appears  that  Bruno  Etienne’s  call  for  efforts  to  understand  the
unacceptable has not been heeded in this case. We shall take a closer look at one of the
largest and most poorly understood foreign contingents in Iraq, namely the Saudis. Who
are the Saudi fighters? Why do they leave quiet lives of material comfort for war and
likely death in a foreign country? 
3 The Saudi militant is often caricatured as the archetypal suicide bomber, the relentless
radical who seeks war for no apparent reason other than to kill and be killed. Much of the
literature on militant Islamism presumes the existence of a “Saudi extremism” which
ensures a permanent flow of militants to conflict zones and terrorist groups. However,
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this ignores the fundamental issue of why some Saudis go to Iraq while other Saudis do
not. Such views also strip Saudi militants of their individuality and humanity. Louis-Jean
Duclos,  Olivier  Grojean  and  Eleanor  Pavey  showed  that  within  one  and  the  same
movement  there  are  different  paths  to  self-sacrifice.  There  is  no  reason why Saudis
should be different. In order to answer our question we must therefore delve into the life
stories  of  the  militants  and examine  their  background,  motivations  and recruitment
patterns.  
4 Until  recently,  this  type of  research was made difficult  by the clandestine nature of
violent groups and Saudi Arabia’s strict visa regulations. With the advent of the Internet –
which Saudi and Iraqi militants have warmly embraced – it became possible to study
these communities through their own writings and publications. Saudi Arabia has also
begun to  open up  for  Western  social  scientists,  and allowed this  author  to  conduct
extensive fieldwork in the Kingdom. Using jihadist literature on the Internet combined
with secondary sources, I compiled the names and biographies of 205 Saudis who died in
Iraq between 2003 and 20052. I shall use these data to address four sub-questions: Who
goes to Iraq? Why do they go? How do they go? And what is their role in the insurgency?
5 We shall see that the number of Saudis who have gone to Iraq is disputed, but seems not
to  exceed  1500.  Volunteers  come  from  a  variety  of  geographic  and  socio-economic
backgrounds, though the north is overrepresented and the south underrepresented. They
are motivated by pan-Islamic nationalism, and inspired by friends and relatives who have
gone  before  them.  Some  are  enlisted  by  professional  recruiters,  others  seek  out
“facilitators” on their own initiative. In Iraq, Saudis are overrepresented among suicide
bombers. The number of Saudis going to Iraq peaked in late 2004 and continues to fall.
Saudi authorities have acted to stem recruitment, but they are restricted politically by
public perceptions of the Iraqi resistance as legitimate.
6 Saudi participation in foreign conflicts is nothing new. The Saudis who have died fighting
in Iraq are but the latest generation in what is known in jihadist terminology as the
“Caravan of Martyrs.” Since the mid-1980s, thousands of young Saudi men have fought as
mujahidin in  a  variety  of  countries:  Afghanistan,  Bosnia,  Tajikistan,  Chechnya,  and
Afghanistan again.  The  Saudis  have  never  been the  sole  foreign contingent  in  these
conflicts,  and  they  have  not  always  been  overrepresented.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a
widespread perception – though no reliable figures exist – that the level of the Saudi
participation in foreign jihad zones has been consistently very high3.
7 The reasons for this activism are not to be found in the Wahhabi religious tradition as
such, or in some inherent Saudi radicalism, but rather in the strength of so-called pan-
Islamic  nationalism  in  Saudi  Arabia.  This  nationalism  was  perfectly  illustrated  in  a
Washington  Post  interview  with  a  random  Saudi  student  in  2005:  “Americans  can't
imagine how a young man living a decent life in Riyadh could feel so much love and
passion for a fellow Muslim and feel compelled to go and fight when he sees television
footage of Iraqis or Afghans being killed and tortured. But that's a result of the strong
Islamic blood ties.”4 These “blood ties” are of course imagined, and stem from a belief in
the inherent unity of the Islamic nation (the umma). Like all nationalisms, pan-Islamism is
a construct;  but why should Saudis feel a deeper sense of pan-Islamic solidarity than
Muslims from other countries? 
8 The reasons are historical  and political.  In the 1960s,  King Faisal  emphasised Islamic
Solidarity (al-tadamun al-islami) as a counterweight to Nasser’s Arab nationalism. From the
mid-1980s onward, the Saudi state actively promoted pan-Islamic nationalism to boost its
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own  legitimacy  and  facilitate  mobilisation  for  the  Afghan  jihad.  This  pan-Islamic
nationalist discourse emphasised the moral responsibility of Saudis to support oppressed
Muslims abroad. In the early 1990s, the moderate Islamist opposition began adopting a
similar rhetoric – thus contesting the state’s hold of pan-Islamic nationalism as a source
of  legitimacy.  Hence there emerged a political  culture of  one-upmanship of  declared
solidarity with Muslim causes abroad. This in turn produced a relatively high level of
social acceptance for financial and military support directed towards Muslim resistance
movements in places such as Palestine, Bosnia and Chechnya. The line between charity
and armed support became blurred, and jihad participation came to be seen by many as
an  act  of  altruism and  courage.  Taking  part in  clearly  defined  territorial  resistance
struggles – as opposed to international terrorism or domestic militancy – was considered
by many religious Saudis as entirely legitimate. 
9 In the Western scholarship on militant Islamism, the notion of pan-Islamic nationalism is
very  rarely  used.  This  rather  surprising  fact  may  be  due  to  a  Western  tendency  to
associate nationalism with the nation-state. Another reason may be that global jihadists
are seen as the most extreme – and thus least rational - actors in the militant Islamist
landscape.  However,  viewing  global  jihadism  as  an  extreme  form  of  pan-Islamic
nationalism  allows  us  to  explain  crucial  elements  of  the  activism  of  al-Qaida-style
activists. From this perspective, the Saudis who travel to Iraq are in fact not going abroad
to fight for someone else’s territory - they are simply moving to a different part of the
Muslim world to defend their common Muslim territory.
10 The situation in Iraq after the US-led invasion in March 2003 was seen by many as a
textbook case of defensive jihad. Foreign military forces occupied Muslim territory after
what was widely perceived to be unjustified aggression. For the pan-Islamic nationalist
there was no real difference between the situation in Iraq and, for example, that of 1980s
Afghanistan. As a Saudi Intelligence official said: “We encouraged our young men to fight
for Islam in Afghanistan. We encouraged our young men to fight for Islam in Bosnia and
Chechnya. We encouraged our young men to fight for Islam in Palestine. Now we are
telling them you are forbidden to fight for Islam in Iraq, and they are confused.”5
11 What  had  changed  was  of  course  the  political  context.  In  the  so-called  “war  on
terrorism”,  the  distinction  between  localised  guerrilla  warfare  and  international
terrorism became irrelevant. Moreover, the campaign of violence launched inside Saudi
Arabia in 2003 by veterans from Afghanistan made the Saudi authorities acutely aware of
the security risk posed by war veterans. Thus Government-affiliated clerics such as Abd
al-Muhsin  al-Ubaykan  have  declared  that  the  insurgency  in  Iraq  amounts  to  fitna
[sedition] and is illegitimate.6
12 This  climate  change  was  perfectly  illustrated  in  November  2004,  when  a  group  of
prominent Saudi religious scholars released a statement saying armed resistance to the
US occupation was legitimate for the Iraqi people.7 It did not encourage Saudis to go to Iraq,
and in subsequent statements some signatories even explicitly discouraged young Saudis
from joining the Iraqi jihad.8 Yet the statement was widely condemned by Western and
official Saudi media as incitement for terrorism. 
13 However, the statement had simply reflected the mainstream position in Islamist circles
in Saudi Arabia. According to this view, the Iraqi resistance amounts to a legitimate jihad,
and represents a collective duty (so-called fard kifaya) for the Islamic nation. It is thus
permissible – though not necessary – for Saudis to take part.9 Of course, in more radical
Islamist communities, participation in the Iraqi jihad is considered an individual duty (so
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called fard ayn) for all Muslims, not just Iraqis. The necessity to resist the US-led forces in
Iraq became a central theme in the global jihadist literature as early as 2002, and Iraq
soon  became  the  pan-Islamic  nationalist  cause  par  excellence.10 In  pan-Islamist  Saudi
Arabia, this struck a deep chord.
14 The  first  Saudis  militants  arrived  in  northern  Iraq  in  early  2003,  before  the  US-led
invasion.11 From March 2003 onwards, there were regular media reports about foreign
fighters, including Saudis, trickling in to Iraq.12 The first arrests of Saudis occurred in
June 2003 and jihadist websites began announcing the deaths of Saudi martyrs in Iraq in
the summer of 200313.
15 Departure dates in jihadist biographies indicate that the flow of Saudi recruits to Iraq
increased considerably over the summer of 2004, peaking around the time of the second
siege  on Falluja  in  November  2004.  The increase  in  the  second half  of  2004 may be
explained by a number of factors. In Saudi Arabia, the domestic terrorism campaign was
considerably weakened in mid-2004, and the debate in the Saudi jihadist community over
whether to fight in Iraq or at home was largely settled over the summer 2004 in favour of
Iraq.  Inside  Iraq,  the  capture  of  Saddam  Hussein  in  December  2003  stimulated
recruitment, because it removed fears in Islamist communities that fighting in Iraq might
benefit the Baath party. The first Falluja siege (April 2004) further galvanized support
because  it  was  perceived  by  jihadists  as  a  victory,  and  enabled  the  creation  of  a
stronghold for Zarqawi’s group in Falluja. The publicity generated by events such as the
Abu  Ghraib  scandal  and  the  2004  Iraqi  kidnapping  campaign  also  fuelled  foreign
recruitment to Iraq. Since late 2004, the number of Saudis entering Iraq seems to have
decreased somewhat, partly as a result of boosted border security and the dismantling of
personnel-smuggling networks.14 However, there is still a steady flow of Saudis and other
foreign militants to Iraq.15
16 The overall number of Saudis who have gone to Iraq is disputed and may never be known.
The Saudi Interior ministry has never produced official figures. The lowest estimates –
about 350 by August 2005 – have come from government-affiliated sources.16 The highest
estimates  come  from  Saudi  opposition  figures  such  as  Muhammad  al-Mas‘ari,  who
claimed that there were 5000 Saudis in Baghdad as early as October 200317. The real figure
is likely to be somewhere in between. Anonymous Saudi security officials were quoted in
mid-2005 as saying the figure was between 2000 and 3000.18 By collecting open-source
references  to  dead  or  arrested  Saudis  in  Iraq,  this  author  arrived  at  a  total  of  421
individuals (248 named martyrs and detainees and 173 anonymous detainees). This list is
no doubt incomplete; some may still be fighting in Iraq, others may have died without
being mentioned in the jihadist literature, and anecdotal evidence suggests that a number
of people have gone to Iraq and returned quietly to Saudi Arabia.19 Nevertheless, this
author sees no reason to assume that the figure is much larger than 1500 individuals,
particularly given that the total number of foreign fighters in Iraq does not seem to have
exceeded 3000 at any given time.20
17 There  is  a  widespread  perception  that  the  Saudis  are  significantly  overrepresented
among the foreign fighters in Iraq.21 Estimates range from 12% to 61%, but it is virtually
impossible to provide an authoritative figure.22 The widely diverging estimates reflect the
general lack of information about the insurgency, as well as the highly contentious nature
of the debate over the role of Saudis in Iraq. This makes it all the more important to study
the Saudi contingent in detail with publicly available information.
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18 The 205 Saudis martyrs in our sample were young males, who were on average 23 years
old in 2003 (the youngest was 18, the oldest 39). This relatively low average indicates that
the Saudis in Iraq represent a new generation of mujahidin.23 Indeed, only 9 of the 205 are
known to have had previous combat experience from Afghanistan, Bosnia or elsewhere.
This shows that the recruitment to Iraq is a distinct and spontaneous phenomenon whose
relation to the old al-Qaida networks is only peripheral. 
19 Although data on their socio-economic background are limited, it points to a very diverse
group. Some were very poor, others came from rich and privileged families. Information
about their education level is also sparse, but indicates that many were highly educated:
14 of the 16 for whom we know the education level attended higher education, one even
had a doctorate. We know the occupation of 26 individuals, which included 14 students, 3
private  sector  workers,  2  government  clerks,  2  nurses,  2  police/military  officers,  a
teacher, a car mechanic and a meteorologist.
20 The sample is also very diverse in terms of geographic and tribal origin. Our data on
geographic origin show that all regions except Jizan in the far south are represented (see
table  1)  24.  When  compared  to  the  overall  distribution  of  the  population,  the  most
overrepresented regions are the central  regions of  Riyadh and Qasim,  as  well  as  the
north-western regions of Tabuk, Jawf and Ha’il.25 The most underrepresented regions in
our sample are in fact in the southern regions of Jizan, Najran, Asir and Baha. This firmly
contradicts  the  widespread  perception  (which  derives  from the  profiles  of  the  9/11
hijackers)  of  the  southern  regions  of  Saudi  Arabia  as  the  main  exporters  of  Saudi
militants.26
21 The relatively large presence of “northerners” suggests that geographic proximity to the
battlefield has affected recruitment to Iraq. Northerners may have been more capable of
infiltrating the Saudi-Iraqi border. They may also have been more sensitive to the US
military presence which was more visible in the north in early 2003 27. Tribal loyalties
may also have played a role, as a number of tribes are present on both sides of the border.
So-called “shared tribes” like the Shammar are prominently represented in our sample
(see table 2). It is worth mentioning that the tribal distribution in our sample is very
broad and covers most major tribes. With the possible exception of the shared tribes in
the north, it is difficult to speak of a tribal factor in the recruitment of Saudis to Iraq.
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Table 1: Geographic origin (by region) of Saudi militants 
Table 2: Tribal background of Saudi militants
22 This socio-economic, geographic, and tribal diversity tells us two important things. First,
it shows that militancy is not confined to a particular section of Saudi society (the “poor”,
the “southerners”, the “Bedouins” etc). Second, it indicates that sympathy for the Iraqi
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cause cuts across Saudi society. The significance of this point becomes clearer when we
compare the Saudis in Iraq to a sample of 240 domestic militants from the group “al-
Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula” (QAP). The Saudis in Iraq represent a more diverse group
than the QAP, be it in terms of socio-economic, geographic, or tribal origin (see tables 1
and 2) 28. This likely reflects the difference in the perceived legitimacy of fighting in Iraq
and fighting at home.29 It was far easier to motivate people to fight the US military in Iraq
than to blow up cars in the streets of Riyadh.
23 Saudis in Iraq seem to have been driven by composite motivational factors. The declared
motivations were of two main kinds. The first was altruistic: to liberate a fellow Muslim
people from US occupation. The second was personal: to achieve martyrdom and go to
heaven.  In  the  biographies  on  jihadist  websites,  these  motivations  are  repeated  in
standardised phrases, to the extent that one wonders about their sincerity.30
24 However, when supplemented by additional sources such as interviews with militants and
recruiters, it does indeed seem that most Saudi recruits genuinely did hold a deep belief
in and desire for martyrdom, at least by the time they entered Iraq.31 For many, the
prospect of going to heaven seems to have been more important than achieving political
aims.32 This obsession with martyrdom may have been partly driven by group dynamics,
and partly promoted by leaders and recruiters for operational purposes. 
25 It is difficult to know whether Saudi recruits were more focused on martyrdom than
volunteers from other countries. Many commentators have suggested this, pointing to
official  US and Iraqi  claims that  Saudis  are overrepresented among suicide bombers.
Some jihadist sources speak of Saudis being particularly obsessed with martyrdom, but
the evidence remains anecdotal.33 Perhaps the only reasonably convincing argument in
favour of this hypothesis is the ratio of martyred vs captured Saudis in Iraq. There is a
large discrepancy between the proportion of Saudis on the lists of Arab martyrs in Iraq on
the  one hand (ca  60%)  and the  proportion of  Saudis  among foreign nationals  in  US
custody in Iraq on the other (ca 10%) 34. Even if we account for biased reporting, this
seems to suggest that the death rate is higher for Saudis than for other groups.35 There
are several possible explanations for this. The Saudis may have been used by insurgent
leaders as “cannon fodder”, they may have been less competent fighters, or they may
have been more motivated for dangerous or suicidal combat operations.
26 It is important to stress that even if it were possible to prove that desire for martyrdom is
particularly strong among Saudi  jihadists,  it  would not make politics  irrelevant.  It  is
perfectly possible to be motivated by political frustration and extreme religiosity at the
same time. In fact the two are linked: if a struggle is not considered a legitimate jihad,
then martyrdom is not possible.
27 Political factors are indeed frequently cited as motivations for going to Iraq. Beyond the
invasion itself, specific events such as the Abu Ghraib scandal and the sieges on Falluja
are  cited  by  several  recruits  as  catalysts  for  their  decision  to  depart  for  the  Iraqi
battlefield.36 Equally  important  is  the  effect  of  such events  on  parents.  A  number  of
potential  recruits would not go to Iraq without permission from their parents.  Some
parents who initially refused changed their minds after being outraged by pictures from
Iraq.37
28 However, if we read between the lines of the declared motivations, we find other factors
of a more social character which may have also been significant. A number of recruits
were clearly inspired by friends or relatives who have gone abroad for jihad before them.
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38 Some may have wanted to emulate their fathers and uncles, others believed they would
meet martyred friends in heaven if they were martyred too, yet others may have felt a
form of peer pressure. The news of a young Saudi’s martyrdom would spread quickly in
that person’s family and neighbourhood, particularly since the family would often hold
widely  publicised  condolence  ceremonies  in  their  house.  In  some  villages  or
neighbourhoods, like Riyadh’s Suwaydi district or the Thaqba area near Dammam, the
high frequency of such news meant that most residents knew someone who had gone to
Iraq. This in turn lowered their threshold for activism, a phenomenon known from so-
called “assurance games” in rational  choice theory.39 Such social  networks were also
important for the patterns of recruitment of Saudis to Iraq.
29 Saudis were mobilised for combat in Iraq in a number of  different ways.  Some were
subject to classical top-down recruitment. Others followed a bottom-up process whereby
they radicalised alone or with friends before seeking out “facilitators” or “gatekeepers”
on their own initiative.
30 Top down recruitments occurred in a number of different ways and places. Much of this
type  of  recruitment  followed  pre-existing  social  links  and  took  place  in  private
gatherings. Another major arena for recruiters and inciters was Mecca, where thousands
of young Saudis go during hajj or the last ten days of Ramadan. Mecca offers excellent
opportunities for recruitment, because pilgrims are more open to new encounters and
religious experiences than usual, and because the crowds complicate policing.40 For many
young Saudis, going to Mecca is also way of escaping parental supervision. A number of
Saudis decided to go to Iraq after spending time in Mecca.41
31 Another slightly more indirect form of top-down recruitment is incitement from religious
clerics. There are strong indications that both local imams and some senior clerics were
encouraging participation in the Iraqi  resistance.42 Some of the Saudis in our sample
explicitly said they were inspired to go to Iraq by sermons at  a  local  mosque.43 One
biographer  boasted that  Abdallah bin  Jibrin,  one  of  the  Kingdom’s  most  well-known
religious  scholars,  came  to  the  family's  house  to  congratulate  them  on  their  son's
martyrdom.44
32 There are also many examples of bottom-up recruitment to Iraq. The Internet has no
doubt played a major role in the “self-radicalisation” of many young Saudis. Since the
outbreak of the Iraq war, jihadist Internet sites have been flooded with pictures, videos
and written propaganda about the suffering of the Iraqi people under US occupation.45
The Internet has also facilitated communication between interested recruits and so-called
“gatekeepers” who can give practical advice on how to get to Iraq. Written instructions
on how to join the Iraqi jihad have also circulated online.46 However, it seems that most
cases  of  bottom  up  recruitment  follow  informal  social  networks.  In  many  Islamist
communities the gatekeepers are relatively well known, meaning that potential recruits
know who to approach.47
33 In most cases the bottom-up recruitment process was a group experience. Pairs or groups
of friends would decide to go to Iraq together. A majority of the people in our sample
travelled to Iraq together with at least one close friend, brother or cousin.48
34 Many of the biographies of Saudi martyrs in Iraq include the date of arrival in Iraq. This
data show that a striking number of people travelled during or around the month of
Ramadan,  particularly  in  2004.  The  main  reason for  this  increase  may be  historical,
because  the  second  Falluja  siege  occurred  in  Ramadan  1425  h,  ie  November  2004.
Saudis in Iraq: Patterns of Radicalization and Recruitment
Cultures & Conflits , English documents | 2008
8
However, many of the biographies accord great importance to the fact that an individual
travelled to Iraq on or around Ramadan. If a person had been martyred during the last
ten days of Ramadan or (even better) on Laylat al-Qadr (27 Ramadan), the anniversary for
the first Quranic revelation, that too is highlighted in the biography.49 It would seem that
the belief in the special benefits of achieving martyrdom during Ramadan affected the
patterns of Saudi recruitment to Iraq.50
35 Saudis went to Iraq through a number of different routes. The preferred routes varied
over time with changes in countermeasures on the various border crossings. Those who
went  to  Kurdistan  just  before  the  war  travelled  through  Qatar  and  Iran.  Up  until
approximately mid-2004, the Saudi-Iraqi border was also porous enough to cross. This
was the preferred route for those without travel documents (many well-known radicals
had  had  their  passports  confiscated  by  the  police).  From  mid  2004  onward,  Saudis
tightened border security, and the majority of volunteers travelled to Yemen, from there
to Syria and into Iraq. US forces had problems policing the Iraqi-Syrian border area north
of the River Euphrates because most forces were stationed on the south bank and there
were few bridges strong enough to carry armed vehicles.51 In mid-2005, the US military
conducted a massive operation to gain control of this area, and this reduced the flow of
foreign militants across the Syrian-Iraqi border. There have also been cases of Saudis
entering Iraq through Jordan and Turkey.
36 Once inside Iraq, most Saudi volunteers would go wherever their facilitator sent them.52
The majority of Saudis in Iraq joined al-Zarqawi’s network, which was by far the most
multinational  of  all  the  militant  groups  in  Iraq.53 The  biographies  speak of  frequent
communications  on  open  telephone  lines  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  Iraq.  Some
volunteers would call their families regularly from Iraq, other were never heard from
again.  However,  when  a  person  was  killed,  one  of  their  companions  would  call  the
martyr's  family  to  inform and congratulate them.  The news of  the death of  a  Saudi
martyr  in  Iraq  was  often  widely  announced  and  even  celebrated  in  the  person's
neighbourhood and family. The mobile phone number of the martyr's father or brother –
together  with  addresses  and  directions  for  the  family's  house  –  was  posted  on  the
Internet so that anybody could visit or call to congratulate or express condolences.
37 The precise role of Saudi contingent in the insurgency is very difficult to determine,
because we know so little about the composition and inner workings of the insurgency in
general. In the early phases of the insurgency, the role of the foreigners in Iraq tended to
be  exaggerated.  Now  the  standard  (and  slightly  clichéd)  phrase  is  that  they  are
“numerically small but operationally significant”. The foreigners, who are believed to
represent between 5% and 10% of the total number of Sunni insurgents, are said to have
introduced new and brutal tactics, ignited sectarian violence and executed the majority
of suicide bombings in Iraq.54
38 The  Saudis  seem  to  have  operated mainly  in  the  lower  echelons  of  the  militant
organisations  in  Iraq.55 Saudi  volunteers  have  executed  a  large  number  of  suicide
bombings,  including  some  of  the  most  spectacular  attacks  in  the  history  of  the
insurgency.56 At least 33 in our sample of 205 martyrs died in suicide bombings. There are
indications that jihadist groups in Iraq have streamlined the recruitment and assignment
of Saudis for suicide operations. In early 2005, a Saudi named Ahmad al-Shayea barely
survived a suicide bombing in Baghdad. He later told media that the operation had been
carried out against his will - he had been told to drive a truck without knowing that it was
loaded with explosives.57 Official Saudi media seized on the story and used it to tell the
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public  that  Saudi  recruits  were being duped and exploited by Iraqi  groups that  only
wanted Saudis as funders and suicide bombers.58 The instrumentalisation of Saudis for
suicide attacks illustrates that suicide operations must be understood within a broader
organisational context, not just as a product of individual choice.
39 It would seem that the both the size and the importance of the Saudi contingent in Iraq
has been somewhat overestimated by commentators thus far. This may be related to a
broader tendency to exaggerate the importance of the external component in order to
downplay  the  local  support  for  the  insurgency.  Although Saudis  have  contributed  a
number of  suicide bombings,  they seem to have had a limited impact on the overall
strategy adopted by insurgent groups in Iraq in recent years. Moreover, the number of
Saudis going to Iraq has been on the decrease since early 2005,  and the death of al-
Zarqawi in June 2006 will not make it easier for foreign fighters to enter Iraq and take a
meaningful part in combat. 
40 Many have warned against the threat to domestic Saudi security posed by returnees from
Iraq.59 In  the  past,  veterans  from Afghanistan played a  leading role  in  orchestrating
violence inside Saudi Arabia. Brutalised “Iraq veterans” might try the same in the future.
While this threat that must be taken seriously, we should also keep in mind some major
differences between the “Afghan Arabs” and the “Iraqi Arabs”. One is size: the number of
Saudis in Iraq may not be higher than a thousand, and many of them will die on the
battlefield.  Second is the pattern of return: unlike the returnees from Afghanistan in
early 2002,  the Iraq veterans will  return in trickles and can thus be dealt with more
effectively. Third is the preparedness of the security services: while the returnees from
Afghanistan were not dealt with as a security threat,  the returnees from Iraq will  be
followed very closely.
41 In  its  battle  against  domestic  militancy,  Saudi  Arabia  has  adopted  a  diversified  and
measured counterterrorism approach which has been very effective. However, in the long
term, the fundamental issue is whether the Kingdom is able and willing to counter the
extreme pan-Islamic nationalism which drives recruitment to foreign jihad zones and
inspires attacks on Western targets inside Saudi Arabia. This is no easy task, for there are
a  large  number  of  loudmouth  populist  preachers  in  the  Kingdom,  and  pan-Islamic
nationalism is on the rise worldwide. Moreover, the United States continues to fan the
pan-Islamist fire with its foreign policy, most recently in Lebanon. Thus the Saudi fighters
currently in Iraq are probably not the last generation of volunteers for combat on foreign
territory.
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ABSTRACTS
Dans cet article, Thomas Hegghammer analyse, au travers d’un échantillon de deux cent cinq «
martyrs » saoudiens tués en Irak depuis 2003, les différentes trajectoires ayant conduit de jeunes
Saoudiens établis d’embrasser le combat et une mort probable sur le champ de bataille irakien.
L’étude de leurs trajectoires individuelles et collectives permet d’avoir une image plus complexe
et détaillée de leurs antécédents, de leurs motivations, de leurs modes de recrutement ainsi que
de leur rôle dans l’insurrection irakienne. En montrant que leur origine géographique et sociale
ne joue pas un rôle déterminant, que des motivations plus généralement sociales et politiques
jouent un rôle crucial et qu’il s’agit d’une génération différente de celle des « Arabes afghans » et
de l’ancien réseau Al-Qaïda, cet article remet en question nombre de représentations communes
du phénomène.  Il  montre  également  que,  contrairement  à  ce  qui  est  généralement  dit,  le  «
contingent » saoudien ne semble pas jouer un rôle crucial dans l’insurrection en Irak.
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